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Abstract 
 
   
This paper explores voting patterns in the Council of the European Union (EU) between 
May 2004 and the end of December 2006, studying the full set of voting records for this 
institution. It analyzes government vote choices in the Council on the basis of ordered 
logistic regression analysis, explaining the propensity of EU member states to vote ‘yes’, 
abstain from voting, or vote ‘no’. The paper explains voting behavior in the Council on 
the basis of selected independent variables, notably governments' absolute and relative 
positions  on  the  left-right  policy  dimension,  support  for  European  integration  among 
domestic  audiences,  member  states’  population  size  and  their  positions  as  either  net 
beneficiaries or net payers into the EU budget. Our empirical analysis reveals that voting 
behavior is markedly different for the group of the EU’s older as compared to its newer 
member states, with some of our explanatory variables even displaying opposite signs for 
these two groups in our statistical analyses.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Patterns of decision making in the European Union (EU), in recent decades, have been 
subjected  to  vigorous  formal  analysis.  However,  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  the 
empirical  analysis  of  voting  patterns  in  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  (i.e.  the 
‘Council of Ministers’). This may partially be explained by the fact that traditionally, 
decisions in the Council were  entirely non-public. Although both the transparency of 
decision  making  and  the  flow  of  information  regarding  Council  decisions  have 
considerably increased, notably since the mid-1990s, there remains a lack of systematic 
analysis of voting behavior in the Council.  
However,  earlier  empirical  analyses  of  Council  voting  records  are  Lane  and 
Mattila (1998), Hosli (1999) and Mattila and Lane (2001). On the basis of data collection 
on  EU  member  states'  actual  voting  behavior  in  the  Council,  Mattila  (2004)  studies 
reasons  for  EU  states  to  choose  specific  voting  options.  He  presents  a  range  of 
hypotheses, partially based on recent literature, and tests them on the basis of empirical 
data. In an analysis close to Mattila (2004), Hagemann (2005) explores potential factors 
that influence Council voting behavior. She uses similar data, but partially extends the 
database used in Mattila's research by accounting for different stages of decision making 
in the EU decision-making process (i.e. whether votes in the Council are cast at the final 
stage of the legislative process or before the last stage).  
More recently, Hayes-Renshaw et al. (2006) give an in-depth analysis of Council 
voting patterns and assess clusters among member states indicating government voting 
behavior  in  this  institution.  Plechanovová  (2008),  on  the  basis  of  an  extensive  data 
collection  on  Council  voting  behavior,  in  the  different  stages  of  the  EU  legislative 
process,  explores  voting  patterns  since  the  2004  enlargement.  Her  empirical  analysis 
reveals that there are no consistent patterns of coalition-building among EU governments 
in  Council  voting  behavior.  Her  cluster  analysis  shows  that,  against  common 
expectations, there also are no given divisions in this institution when comparing the 
EU’s ‘new’ with its older member states. 
  A striking feature of Council decision-making is that decision-making is usually 
by consensus. Reaching consensus, however, is likely to be more difficult with a higher   5 
number of member states. In general terms, it seems that governments as represented in 
the Council either cast negative votes or abstain from voting if they wish to ‘make a 
point’ in domestic politics. Accordingly, actual voting in the Council is rather rare and 
only a small percentage of decisions are characterized by ‘contested votes’, i.e. decisions 
in which some Council members vote against the majority or abstain from voting (e.g. 
Mattila and Lane 2001, Hosli 2007, Plechanovová 2008). The small share of contested 
decisions  probably  means  that  governments  do  not  necessarily  want  to  record  their 
dissent officially. This pattern may be especially relevant when the respective decision is 
rather insignificant to the home country.  
This paper aims to build on former empirical work on Council voting behavior by 
examining information available on cleavages, votes and decision behavior within the 
Council after the 2004 enlargement. We aim to determine which factors best explain 
variation  in  EU  states’  voting  behavior  in  the  Council  for  the  post-2004  phase.  We 
notably aim to determine similarities and differences between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU 
member states. 
On the basis of our multivariate exploration of Council voting behavior, we aim to 
reveal  possible  systematic  underlying  factors  that  determine  vote  outcomes  in  the 
Council. The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
earlier  studies  of  Council  decision-making  and  theoretical  insights  into  cleavage 
structures in EU politics. Section three describes our data as they have been collected 
from different sources and provides an overview of how we ‘measure’ the independent 
variables of our analysis. Section four presents and discusses the results of our statistical 
analysis Finally, section five summarizes the main findings of our paper and concludes. 
 
2.  Cleavages in European Union Politics and Literature on Council Decision-Making 
 
Various  studies  explore  policy  dimensions  that  may  be  relevant  to  EU  politics.  For 
example,  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  party  manifestos  by  European  parliamentary 
groups, Hix (1999), partially confirming earlier insights by Hix and Lord (1997), finds 
that  two  major  policy  dimensions  structure  actor  behavior  in  EU  policy  making:  an 
integration-independence dimension and a left-right policy dimension. In research on the   6 
European Parliament (EP), roll call analyses show that the party groups’ voting behaviour 
reflects their  corresponding positions on the left-right dimension  (Raunio 1997). Hix, 
Noury and Roland (2006), in their analysis of roll call votes in the EP, find evidence for 
an  almost  exclusive  left-right  division.  By  comparison,  Aspinwall  (2002)  analyzes 
government preferences regarding the Treaty of Amsterdam on the basis of information 
contained in an EP report. His analysis confirms the importance of a left-right division in 
EU politics.  
Mattila (2004), in this analysis, uses the location of actors on the left-right scale 
based on the data provided by Hix and Lord (1997: 27-49). Focusing his research on 
voting behavior in the Council between 1995 and 2000, however, he finds that the left-
right policy dimension has only moderate explanatory power regarding the decision of 
EU member states to either abstain or cast a negative vote in the Council. By contrast, the 
left-right policy division generates strongly significant results in the analysis presented by 
Hagemann (2005). Her measures are based on placements of political parties on a left-
right policy dimension as given in Benoit and Laver (2006). Both studies reveal a positive 
relationship between negative votes or abstentions in the Council and left-right policy 
locations, suggesting that right-of-center  governments in the EU are more inclined to 
oppose the majority in the Council than those that are situated left-of-center. Both studies 
also find an interaction between this policy dimension and support for EU integration. 
Including  additional  information  on  left-right  positioning  into  the  analysis,  notably 
calculations  for  each  year  between  1995  and  2004,  Hosli  (2007)  finds  that  it  is  not 
absolute  left-right  placement  that  matters  but  relative  positioning  as  regards  the 
propensity of governments to oppose the majority in EU Council voting. Accordingly, the 
further a government is situated from the average EU government left-right position, the 
higher its probability to oppose the Council majority. 
Mattila  (2004)  also  employs  EU  governments’  extent  of  ‘Euroskepticism’  or 
support  for  European  integration,  as  an  explanatory  variable.  Hagemann  (2005) 
approximates governments’ position on the ‘more-less integration’ scale by using data 
based on expert surveys as provided in Marks and Steenbergen (2004). As Eurobarometer 
(EB) data are available twice a year basis for the time period analyzed here, we will use 
Eurobarometer information on public support for EU integration for the 2004 to 2006   7 
time span. In accordance with earlier research, it is assumed that governments of EU 
states with a ‘pro-European’ public will tend to agree with the majority and will also be 
less inclined to either cast a negative vote or abstain in the framework of Council voting 
procedures. 
In an empirical study of decision-making in the EU for the time span 1999 to 
2001, Thomson et al. (2004) find that there are no clear dimensions on which actors align 
in EU policy making. The only dimension for which some (relatively weak) empirical 
support can be found is a North-South cleavage. However, the study finds that apart from 
this  division  there  are  no  clear  and  consistent  patterns  of  coalition  formation  among 
governments in EU decision-making. Similarly, Elgström et al. (2001) find little evidence 
for cleavages in EU decision making apart from a North-South division in processes of 
EU coalition formation; these findings are largely supported by Zimmer et al. (2005).  
Research aiming to test the potential existence of a ‘North-South cleavage’ in EU 
politics  usually  distinguishes  between  EU  states  as  either  ‘net  beneficiaries’  or  ‘net 
payers’  with  regards  to  the  EU  budget.  ‘Net  beneficiaries’  generally  benefit  from 
domestic publics who are supportive of EU integration. Mattila (2004), in a bivariate 
assessment of voting behavior, finds the influence of governments’ EU budget status on 
voting outcomes to be significant. However, the significance no longer materializes in his 
multivariate exploration of Council voting records. Similarly, the North-South division 
has no significant effect in the analysis presented by Hagemann (2005). Nonetheless, net 
budget status will be used as an additional explanatory variable for voting behavior in the 
Council  in  this  paper,  assuming,  in  accordance  with  earlier  research,  that  ‘net 
beneficiaries’ will be more inclined to vote with the majority in formal Council voting 
procedures.  
  Several studies have illustrated potential divisions between small and large states 
in the EU (e.g. Moberg 1998, 2002). In general terms, larger member states are likely to 
have  more  influence  in  the  preparatory  stages  of  any  decision.  This  is  because  the 
officials  in  the  preparatory  work  have  to  take  into  account  the  opinions  of  the  large 
countries in advance in order to ensure the success of their proposals. On the other hand, 
the available roll call analyses show that large countries vote against the majority clearly 
more  often  than  smaller  countries  (e.g.  Mattila  and  Lane  2001).  Heisenberg  (2005)   8 
emphasizes that the propensity to vote against a proposal in the Council, or to abstain, is 
correlated with size rather than with wealth, net contributor status or the number of years 
a state has been a member of the EU. Hence, it is interesting to explore whether the size 
of  EU  member  states,  as  measured  by  their  voting  weight  in  the  Council,  affects 
respective voting behavior.  
Several authors have explored the role and significance of the Council presidency 
(e.g.  Tallberg  2004,  Schout  and  Vanhoonacker  2006).  Research  often  focuses  on  the 
question of whether the president tends to act as an ‘honest broker’ or supports his or her 
government’s interests in Council decision making. The presidency must act as a broker 
between the other member countries and try to find acceptable solutions to the problems 
on the table. This means that the presidency must (at least partially) give up the task of 
promoting its own positions in favour of trying to find solutions that the majority can 
accept. The role as a collective representative means that the presidency must speak for 
the EU and its member states in international settings. If the presidency country takes 
these roles of broker and representative seriously, it means that there is little room for 
independent action.  
Mattila  (2004)  also  includes  this  variable  in  his  analysis  of  Council  voting 
records,  finding  that  governments  which  hold  the  presidency  cast  significantly  fewer 
negative votes and have a lower propensity to abstain than other governments in the EU. 
Mattila’s finding is corroborated by Hagemann (2005). Based on these prior explorations, 
it will subsequently be hypothesized that an EU state holding the presidency will be less 
inclined  to  vote  against  the  majority  in  Council  decision  making  than  other  EU 
governments. 
 
3. Data and Operationalization 
 
The Council roll call data used in this paper are based on information released by the 
Council Secretariat at the Council website (http://ue.eu.int). We notably use the ‘Monthly 
Summary of Council Acts’ documents, listing all legislative and non-legislative decisions 
made by the Council and -- if voting occurred -- which EU member states voted ‘no’ or 
abstained from voting. The time period for the analysis is the EU-25, i.e. from 1 May   9 
2004 to 31 December 2006. During this time period, the Council decided on a total of 
1358 acts (416 legislative acts and 942 other acts). Of this total, about 38 per cent were 
Decisions, 32 per cent Regulations, 8 per cent Directives, 6 per cent Joint Actions. The 
remainder consisted of various other types of decisions (such as resolutions, common 
positions, declarations and agreements).
1  
In our analysis, the dependent variable is governments’ vote choice (‘yes’, ‘no’ or 
abstention). This generates a total of 33’950 observations in our data set: twenty-five EU 
states  multiplied  by  1358  acts.  Each  observation  records  whether  the  respective 
government  in  the  Council  voted  yes,  no  or  abstained  from  voting.  In  our  empirical 
analysis, we treat this variable as ordinal: abstention is assumed to indicate disagreement 
with  the  majority  opinion,  but  not  to  the  extent  that  voting  ‘no’  against  the  Council 
majority does. Accordingly, we code ‘yes’ votes as 1, abstentions as 2 and ‘no’ votes as 
3.
2 
However, roll call data in the Council have several limitations. Most notably, they 
do not contain information on ‘failed’ decisions, i.e. proposals that failed to gather the 
needed majority in the Council to back them. ‘Failed’ acts are not submitted to formal 
vote.  By  comparison,  they  are  usually  sent  back  to  lower  levels  within  the  Council 
structure for further discussion. In addition to this, some member states may disagree 
with the majority, but for some reason, choose not to record their dissent officially by 
formally voting against the proposal or abstaining from voting. The reason for this may 
be that the decision in question is relatively insignificant, and its respective media value 
in the home country low. Whatever the reason, one may assume that the observed number 
of contested decisions in the Council really amounts to a downwards biased estimate of 
the true amount of dissent in the Council (Mattila 2004: 31). Finally, it is possible that 
two countries would vote together against a proposal, but do not actually share similar 
policy preferences. For example, one EU state may vote against a proposal because it 
considers  suggested  cuts  in  agricultural  subsidies  to  be  too  large,  whereas  another 
member  state  may  vote  ‘no’  because  it  considers  the  proposed  cuts  to  be  too  small. 
                                                 
1 For more information on this issue, see Mattila (2008). 
2 Also see Hosli (2007) or Hosli and Uriot (2008) on this coding choice.   10 
However, in most cases, it probably is reasonable to assume that member states voting 
together against a proposal have broadly similar policy preferences. 
In our data set, governments’ positions on the left-right dimension are measured 
on the basis of data provided by Benoit and Laver (2006).
3 Benoit and Laver used expert 
surveys to obtain estimates of the left-right positions of national parties in forty-seven 
modern democracies. Our index is calculated as a weighted average of these positions, 
where  the  weights  are  the  number  of  ministers  each  government  party  had  in  each 
government  (coalition).
4  The  variable  measuring  the  distance  between  any  particular 
government  and  the  Council  average  is  simply  the  absolute  difference  between  the 
position  of  this  government  and  the  weighted  position  all  other  governments  of  EU 
member  states.  (to  calculate  the  average  position  within  the  Council,  member  states’ 
number of votes in the Council is used as a weight). 
Public support for the EU is measured on the basis of Eurobarometer data. The 
“EU support” variable measures general EU support among the citizens in the respective 
member  states.
5  It  is  based  on  the  standard  Eurobarometer  survey  question  asking 
respondents whether they consider the EU membership of their country to be “a good 
thing”, “a bad thing” or neither of these. In our assessment, we measure the difference 
between  the  share  of  respondents  indicating  that  membership  is  “a  good  thing”  as 
opposed to it being “a bad thing”. The Eurobameter survey is held twice per year; we use 
                                                 
3 However, as the Benoit-Laver data set does not contain information on left-right positioning for French 
parties,  we  use  the  taxes  vs.  spending  dimension  of  this  dataset  for  France  instead.  Respective 
measurements are rescaled to fit the left-right dimension as given by Benoit and Laver (2006). 
4  The  same  technique  is  applied  in  Hosli  (2007)  and  Hosli  and  Uriot  (2008).  To  obtain  the  relevant 
information,  we  use  monthly  data.  The  15th  day  of  the  month  is  chosen  as  the  cut-off  point  for  the 
assessment: If a new government took effect on the 16th day of a month, the score used for that month is 
the  score  of  the  previous  government  in  power  (assessed  for  the  remainder  of  the  month).  If  a  new 
government took office before the 15th, however, the score for the month is determined by the assessment 
for the new government.  
5 In the future, we aim to integrate newly released information on the post-enlargement phase -- as provided 
by the Chapel Hill data set on the position of political parties towards European integration -- into our 
analysis. For more general information on these data, e.g. see Marks and Steenbergen (2004).    11 
results from each spring survey to measure public support for EU integration in the first 
half of a year and results from the autumn survey for the remaining six months. 
EU member countries' positions as net beneficiaries or net contributors to the EU 
budget  are  not  easy  to  measure.  There  are  conceptual  and  practical  obstacles  to  the 
calculation  of  the  exact  financial  positions  of  individual  member  states  (Begg  and 
Grimwade  1998:  86).  Nevertheless,  the  European  Commission  (2007)  has  published 
estimates  of  member  states’  annual  budget  balances.  We  adopt  these  figures  for  our 
empirical analysis, but express them in terms of percentages of Gross National Income 
(GNI).
6 Accordingly, figures range from -0.52 per cent for the Netherlands (in 2005) to 
2.68 per cent for Greece (in 2006). 
The remaining independent variables used in our study are fairly straightforward. 
The voting weights variable reflects the number of votes each government has in the 
Council of the EU. The values of this variable range from three votes (Malta) to twenty-
nine  votes  (Germany,  France,  the  UK  and  Italy).  The  ‘new  member  states’  variable 
differentiates between member states that joined the Union in 2004 (coded as 1) and the 
remaining EU states (code 0). Similarly, the presidency variable is based on a dichotomy, 
with 1 indicating that the respective EU state held the presidency and 0 if it did not. The 
‘definitive legislation’ variable indicates whether the act was a ‘definitive legislative act’ 
(coded as 1) or an ‘other act’ (coded as 0). Usually, definitive legislative acts are more 
often  contested  in  the  Council  than  other  acts  (Mattila  2008).  Finally,  our  empirical 
analysis  includes  a  variable  counting  the  number  of  other  member  states  formally 
contesting  the  proposal  within  the  Council  (i.e.  voting  ‘no’  or  abstaining).  The  idea 
motivating inclusion of this control variable is that it is easier for EU states to contest an 
act by formally opposing the Council majority when some of the other member states do 
the same. Hence, we expect this variable to be positively correlated with the dependent 
variable in our analysis: knowing that other governments as represented in the Council 
contest a proposal may encourage other Council members to follow suit. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 On this measurement choice, also see Hosli (2007) and Hosli and Uriot (2008).   12 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Due  to  the  fact  that  our  dependent  variable,  government  vote  choice,  is  ordinal,  we 
employ ordinal logistic regression in our statistical analysis.
7 The dependent variable in 
our  study  takes  on  three  possible  values,  ranging  from  agreement  with  the  Council 
majority (vote choice ‘yes’), to abstaining from voting, and finally, to voting against the 
Council majority (vote choice ‘no’), with the latter option, according to our assumption, 
indicating the strongest level of dissent. Thus, positive coefficients in our analysis imply 
that the probability of dissenting -- abstaining or voting ‘no’ -- increases when the value 
of the respective independent variable increases, and vice versa.  
Our analysis is conducted on the basis of three models, as table 1 demonstrates, 
with each of these models utilizing the same explanatory variables, but a different (sub-
)set in terms of observations. Model 1 assesses effects for all member states in the EU-25. 
By comparison, models 2 and 3 explore differences in Council voting behavior between 
the ‘older’ EU states and those who joined in 2004. Accordingly, model 2 examines 
voting behavior of ‘older’ EU states, whereas model 3 focuses on the new states that 
joined in the 2004 enlargement. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Estimates for model 1 show that only some of the explanatory variables we use have a 
statistically significant effect on vote choice in the Council. First, during their first two 
and one-half  years as EU members, the new member states have voted negatively or 
abstained from voting significantly fewer times than the older member states. Thus, our 
multivariate analysis confirms the result of a more descriptive study covering the same 
time period (see e.g. Mattila 2008). Second, high public support for their country’s EU 
membership decreases the likelihood of a member state opposing the Council majority 
(by either abstaining or voting ‘no’). 
Interestingly,  in  model  1,  the  vote  weight  variable,  reflecting  the  size  or 
                                                 
7 Since our data set encompasses the vote choices for 25 EU member states in the post-enlargement phase, 
we cannot assume observations to be entirely independent from each other. In order to correct for this 
potential bias in our statistical analysis, we cluster standard errors by legislative acts.   13 
importance of member states, is not statistically significant. By contrast, previous studies 
analyzing the pre-enlargement period Council roll calls have found this variable to be an 
important explanatory factor (Mattila 2004).
8  Also the idea that member states’ budget 
positions as net receivers or net contributors to the EU budget could explain their vote 
choices  is  not  supported  in  Model  1.  Earlier  studies  have  produced  mixed  results 
concerning  this  variable:  Hosli  (2007)  and  Hosli  and  Uriot  (2008)  find  it  to  be  a 
significant predictor of vote choice, whereas in Mattila’s (2004) study, the variable fails 
to reach statistical significance. 
We measure governments’ positions on the left-right dimension on the basis of 
two approaches. The first one simply indicates governments’ positions on the left-right 
policy scale (based on data provided by Benoit and Laver 2006), while the second one is 
a  relative  measure:  The  relative  measure  reflects  the  absolute  distance  between  the 
average  left-right  policy  position  in  the  Council  and  the  government  of  a  given  EU 
member state.
9 The idea motivating this latter measure is fairly simple: the further away a 
government is from the average position of all other governments, the more likely it is to 
find itself in disagreement with other Council members. Consequently, this government 
will be more likely to contest decisions to be taken by the Council. In Model 1, however, 
only the first variable is significant, indicating that governments located  right-of-centre 
are  less  likely  to  contest  proposals  discussed  in  the  Council  than  are  more  leftist 
governments.  This  is  an  interesting  finding,  because  earlier  studies  have  found  this 
relationship to be reverse: before enlargement, rightist governments were found to be the 
ones dissenting with the majority most frequently. This transition may be due to the fact 
that since the late 1990s, the ‘left-right center of gravity’ of the Council has shifted from 
the left to the right (Hix 2008, 122-124). It is now the left-of-centre governments that find 
themselves to be in opposition to a Council majority of right-of-centre governments. The 
alternative left-right variable, measuring the relative position of governments on the left-
right policy scale, by comparison, is not statistically significant in Model 1. 
As table 1 shows, the presidency dummy in Model 1 is statistically significant, but 
                                                 
8 The significance of this variable as a predictor, however, is also found to be fairly weak in Hosli and Uriot 
(2008). 
9 Also see Hosli (2007) and Hosli and Uriot (2008).   14 
only at the p<0.1 level. This provides weak support for the hypothesis that member states 
holding the presidency vote less against proposals than other EU member states. This 
result  is  consistent  with  analyses  that  find  Council  presidents  being  able  to  use  their 
position  to  achieve  decision  outcomes  close  to  their  own  preferences  (e.g.  Thomson 
2008; Warntjen 2008) implying that countries holding the presidency indeed have fewer 
incentives to contest proposals in the Council than other EU member states. 
In addition to this, the two control variables with less substantial value to our 
analysis are statistically significant in Model 1: Definitive legislative acts are more often 
contested than other acts. This may be partly due to the fact that voting in the Council 
largely serves the purpose of demonstrating opposition to domestic audiences: signaling 
that one formally objects to final decisions taken by the Council may generate respective 
media attention. Similarly, the variable reflecting how many other member states  are 
contesting the same decision is significant and has a positive coefficient: governments in 
the Council are more inclined to formally vote against a proposal or abstain from voting 
when there are other member states displaying the same vote choice. 
When analyzing results for old member states (Model 2) as compared to new EU 
states (Model 3), new interesting insights materialize. Clearly, several of our explanatory 
variables  have  a  different  effect  on  governments’  voting  decisions  in  a  comparison 
between these two groups. Surprisingly, most of the explanatory variables of substantial 
interest to our analysis even show different signs, indicating that the direction of the 
relationship is often reversed when comparing the new member states with the older EU 
members. 
All in all, results given by Model 2 are largely in line with previous studies that 
assess  effects  before  EU  enlargement:  governments  with  domestic  publics  that  are 
supportive of EU membership are less likely to contest decisions in the Council than are 
governments facing more Euroskeptic publics. Similarly, large net contributors to the EU 
budget  are  more  inclined  to  oppose  the  majority  than  are  net  receivers  (with  this 
statistical result being significant at the p<0.1 level in our analysis). However, there is 
one striking difference when comparing our study to earlier findings:  In the EU-25, the 
voting weight variable has a negative sign (again significant at the p<0.1 level), showing 
that smaller member states are more inclined to vote ‘no’ or abstain than are member   15 
states holding more votes in the Council. Before the 2004 enlargement, larger member 
states were more likely to contest decisions (Mattila 2004). Interestingly, among the new 
EU member states, the likelihood of contesting decisions increases with the number of 
Council votes: Accordingly, the new member states display the same voting patterns as 
did ‘old’ members before enlargement, as new, large member states tend to oppose the 
Council majority most frequently. 
Among the new EU member states, the direction of the effects of budget balance 
and EU-support, surprisingly, is opposite to the direction our statistical analysis discovers 
for older member states. Within the group of new member states, the larger net receivers 
are more likely to oppose the Council majority than countries benefiting less from the EU 
budget. However, one has to bear in mind that all ten new member states are net receivers 
of the EU budget, implying that the range of this variable is smaller among the new 
members as compared to the older ones.  
The  variable  ‘left-right  position’  is  only  significant  –  in  both  its  absolute  and 
relative versions – within the group of older EU member states: In Model 2, both of our 
government left-right assessments display statistically significant effects: As in Model 1, 
left-of-centre governments are more likely to dissent with the Council majority than those 
located more to the right on this policy scale. Furthermore, the distance from the average 
EU government as represented in the Council matters: The further away a government is 
from the average Council position, the more likely it is to vote ‘no’ or abstain in formal 
Council voting procedures. These results appear to confirm the existence of a left-right 
division in the Council (e.g. see Hix 1999), but according to our analysis, only among 
older  member  states.  It  is  certainly  possible,  however,  that  traditional  left-right 
assessments are less appropriate for new EU member states, in which some elements of 
the original left-right policy scale seem to be reversed (with formerly communist political 
parties, located on the left, for example, being more ‘authoritarian’ than their counterparts 
on the right of this policy scale).
10 Accordingly, for new EU states, traditional left-right 
policy positions have no significant effect on voting choice in the Council. 
                                                 
10 This observation led Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and others to introduce the ‘GAL-TAN’ policy scale, 
in  which  political  parties  are  stretching  on  the  scale  from  ‘Green,  Alternative  and  Libertarian’  to 
‘Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist’  E.g. see Marks and Steenbergen (2004).   16 
In  ordinal  logistic  regression  analysis,  the  effects  of  individual  variables  is 
difficult  to  discern  from  the  regression  coefficients.  Therefore,  we  graphically 
demonstrate  the  effects  of  independent  variables  --  government  left-right  location, 
member states’ budget position as net receivers or net contributors, their number Council 
votes and domestic support for EU membership – in Figure 1. Based on the results given 
in Table 1, we calculate expected probabilities for voting ‘no’ or abstaining separately for 
old and new EU member states (Models 2 and 3). We utilize the CLARIFY program (see 
King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001) to calculate estimated values. In these calculations, all 
independent  variables  are  set  to  their  mean  values,  except  the  particular  independent 
variable of interest, which we allow to vary between its minimum and maximum value. 
However, to facilitate interpretation, we do not distinguish between abstentions and ‘no’ 
votes.  Accordingly,  the  lines  in  the  four  sub-figures  of  Figure  1  depict  the  expected 
number  of  contestations  --  abstentions  plus  ‘no’  votes  --  per  year  by  Council 
governments, given different situations as regards values of the independent variables. In 
these figures, the straight lines reflect expected annual contestations for the EU’s old 
member states, whereas the dotted lines show the situation for states that joined the EU in 
2004. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The upper left-hand panel in Figure 1 shows how governments’ left-right location affects 
their vote choice in the Council. The line for new EU states is almost flat, indicating that 
(relative)  government  left-right  position  does  not  affect  their  vote  choice,  confirming 
results given in Table 1. However, for the older member states, the findings are different: 
Governments located at the left or the right ends of this policy dimension are more likely 
to voice their dissent than do governments situated near the Council average. Similarly, 
leftist governments are most likely to contest decisions in formal Council votes. In fact, 
left-wing governments are twice as likely to vote ‘no’ or abstain from voting compared to 
governments located near the left-right average of the Council. 
The  upper  right  panel  of  Figure  1  shows  the  effect  of  member  states’  budget 
positions on their vote choices. This figure demonstrates the different behavior of net   17 
receivers within the groups of old and new member states, respectively: Within the group 
of new member states,  large net  receivers  are  almost three times as likely to  contest 
Council decisions as are large net receivers within the group of the EU’s older member 
states.  When  exploring  the  effect  of  the  number  of  Council  votes  on  vote  choices  – 
displayed in the lower left panel of Figure 1 -- a similar pattern can be discerned: Among 
the  EU’s  older  member  states,  the  effect  of  this  variable  is  negative,  but  almost 
negligible.  By  comparison,  within  the  group  of  the  EU’s  new  member  states,  larger 
countries are most likely to vote ‘no’ or abstain. 
Finally, the lower right-hand panel of Figure 1 shows how public support for EU 
membership has opposite effects in the old as compared to new member states: In old EU  
states, high domestic support for EU membership implies lower levels of explicit dissent 
in  the  Council,  whereas  among  the  new  members,  governments  with  EU-supportive 
publics are the most likely to vote ‘no’ or abstain. It is conceivable that public opinion, in 
new  EU  states,  is  at  times  more  supportive  of  EU  membership  than  are  official 
government  positions,  increasing  the  inclination  of  governments  to  oppose  Council 
decisions, in spite of favorable public attitudes towards EU membership.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
What  determines  voting  behavior  in  the  Council  of  the  EU?  This  paper  assesses 
governments’ overall probability to support a majority decision, abstain or vote ‘no’ in 
Council decision making since the 2004 EU enlargement. It explores possible systematic 
factors that may determine governments’ vote choice in the Council for this time period. 
Our paper uses data between 2004 and 2006 for several independent variables, including 
governments’ absolute and relative left-right positioning, domestic support for European 
integration and net budget states.   
The results of the empirical analysis reveal that there are significant differences in 
voting behavior in the Council when comparing the EU’s older with its newer member 
states. Explanatory variables, at times, even have opposite effects in these two groups of 
member states.    18 
Government  left-right  positioning  has  a  significant  impact  on  governments’ 
inclination  to  oppose  the  Council  majority  among  the  EU’s  older  members,  with 
governments located left-of-center opposing the Council majority more frequently than 
those located to the right on the left-right policy scale. By comparison, for the group of 
new EU states, this variable -- absolute and relative left-right positioning -- does not 
display significant results. 
As far as the effect of the size of EU member states is concerned, in the post-2004 
phase, there was no inclination for larger, ‘old’ EU states to oppose the Council majority 
more frequently than smaller members did; by comparison, within the group of the EU’s 
new  members,  larger  states  have  a  higher  propensity  to  oppose  decisions  in  formal 
Council voting procedures. 
In old member states, net receivers of the EU budget tend to oppose the Council 
majority less frequently; by comparison – holding the effects of other variables, including 
country size, constant – within the group of new EU states, net receivers tend to oppose 
the Council majority more frequently. 
Finally,  and  again  somewhat  counter-intuitively,  within  the  group  of  new  EU 
states,  countries  facing  domestic  publics  that  are  supportive  of  their  country’s  EU 
membership tend to vote ‘no’ or ‘abstain’ more frequently than do member states facing 
more Euroskeptic publics. By comparison, in the EU’s older member states, support for 
EU membership in public opinion is accompanied by a lower propensity to oppose the 
Council majority.   
Our  paper  assesses  the  effect  of  a  range  of  independent  variables  on  Council 
voting  behavior  between  May  2004  and  December  2006.  We  find  evidence  for  the 
existence of cleavages in Council voting that confirm divisions found in other studies of 
EU decision-making, including a left-right and an EU-support division. The time period 
of  our  analysis,  however,  is  relatively  short  to  derive  general  insights  as  regards  the 
effects of explanatory variables on voting behavior in the Council. Nonetheless, the total 
sample of voting records since 2004 is considerable.  
Due to the overall fairly small number of contested decisions in this institution 
(‘no’ votes and abstentions), we do not distinguish between effects in different areas of 
Council decision-making, such as agriculture, fisheries, the internal market or financial   19 
affairs. Future studies may continue the exploration of cleavages in Council voting after 
the 2004 enlargement, and possibly differentiate between effects in different substantive 
areas of Council decision-making. 
    20 
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EU supportTable 1: Explaining Voting Behavior in the Council in the EU-25 (Ordinal Logistic 
Regression Analysis)   
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
       
  All member states  Old member 
states 
New member 
states 
New member state  -  - 
 
-0.513*** 
(0.171) 
 
   
Vote weight 
 
-0.000296 
(0.00783) 
 
-0.0141* 
(0.00826) 
0.0414*** 
(0.0148) 
Budget balance 
 
-0.0294 
(0.0883) 
 
-0.241* 
(0.129) 
0.473*** 
(0.133) 
Presidency  -0.500*  -0.555*  - 
  (0.295) 
 
(0.296)   
EU support  -0.00934***  -0.0144***  0.0191** 
  (0.00305) 
 
(0.00314)  (0.00908) 
Left-right position  -0.0465**  -0.111***  0.0168 
  (0.0186) 
 
(0.0247)  (0.0329) 
0.0425  0.185***  -0.0810  Distance from 
average left-right 
position 
(0.0413) 
 
(0.0509)  (0.0798) 
0.560***  -0.563***  0.548**  Definitive 
legislative act  (0.136) 
 
(0.168)  (0.247) 
0.535***  0.527***  0.558***  Other dissenting 
votes  (0.0369) 
 
(0.0394)  (0.0453) 
Cut 1  3.115***  2.254***  6.092*** 
  (0.350) 
 
(0.384)  (0.733) 
Cut 2  3.794***  2.912***  6.840*** 
  (0.345) 
 
 
(0.385)  (0.751) 
Observations  33950  20370  13580 
Pseudo  
r-square 
0.22 
 
0.21  0.26 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 